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In 2008, the United States joined four other nations with Arctic coasts1 in issuing the 
Ilulissat Declaration, which proclaimed that:
[T]he law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations. . . . We 
remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement 
of any possible overlapping claims. . . . This framework provides a solid 
foundation for responsible management by the fi ve coastal States and 
other users of this Ocean through national implementation and application 
of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a new 
comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.2
By invoking the “law of the sea,” the fi ve Arctic nations were actually referring to 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea3 (UNCLOS).4 Russia, Canada, 
Denmark, and Norway have ratifi ed the Convention. Although the United States has 
not ratifi ed, it considers UNCLOS to generally refl ect customary international law.5
The United States’ willingness to support UNCLOS as the governing legal framework 
in the Arctic is no surprise. Although the Ilulissat Declaration was signed during the 
Bush Administration, the Obama Administration’s National Strategy for the Arctic 
Region proclaims that:
Accession to the Convention would protect U.S. rights, freedoms, and uses 
of the sea and airspace throughout the Arctic region, and strengthen our 
arguments for freedom of navigation and over fl ight through the Northwest 
by James W. Houck
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Passage and the Northern Sea Route. The United States is the only Arctic 
state that is not party to the Convention. Only by joining the Convention can 
we maximize legal certainty and best secure international recognition of our 
sovereign rights with respect to the U.S. extended continental shelf in the 
Arctic and elsewhere, which may hold vast oil, gas, and other resources.6
While chairing hearings in May 2012 as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, current Secretary of State John Kerry lamented that:
While we will sit on the sidelines, Russia and other countries are carving 
up the Arctic and laying claims to the oil and gas riches in that region. 
We, on the other hand, can’t even access the treaty body that provides 
international legitimacy for these types of Arctic claims. Instead of taking 
every possible step to ensure our stake in this resource-rich area, we are 
watching others assert their claims and doing nothing about it because 
we have no legal recourse.7
U.S. industry representatives have echoed this view as well. Jack Gerard, Chief 
Executive Officer of the American Petroleum Institute, has noted that:
Establishing the continental margin beyond 200 miles is particularly 
important in the Arctic, where there are already a number of countries vying 
to expand their offshore jurisdictional claims. . . . The Convention will increase 
certainty in a significant manner and will in turn make it much easier to decide 
to invest billions of dollars in future operations.8
Despite this support, UNCLOS has endured a tortured journey within the United 
States. President Ronald Reagan recognized the treaty’s national security value and 
directed the United States to operate in accord with UNCLOS, with the exception of 
the deep seabed mining provisions.9 President Reagan’s objections to the deep seabed 
mining provisions were later resolved, leading President Bill Clinton to transmit 
the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent on October 7, 1994.10 And yet, the 
United States remains outside the convention. Although the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee has twice voted UNCLOS favorably out of committee by wide margins, the 
convention has never received a full Senate vote.11
The discontinuity between the national desire for an effective Arctic policy and the 
interminable and fractious UNCLOS debate raises a fundamental question: Does 
the United States’ failure to join UNCLOS actually hurt U.S. interests in the Arctic? Is 
UNCLOS an essential foundation for U.S. Arctic policy or an unnecessary morass likely 
to erode U.S. sovereignty and drain vitality from U.S. investments? Moreover, given 
that the Arctic Council has adopted UNCLOS as its governing legal framework and that 
the United States is still able to participate fully in Arctic governance, would UNCLOS 
accession provide the United States any benefit not already available? If the United 
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States can do everything of importance in the Arctic without joining UNCLOS, why go 
to the trouble?
This paper addresses these questions. The paper begins by briefly surveying the 
extent to which the convention’s provisions intersect with United States interests 
in the Arctic. Not surprisingly, there is extensive overlap. The paper then reviews 
arguments that UNCLOS is irrelevant or even antithetical to achieving these important 
U.S. interests. After critiquing the anti-UNCLOS arguments, the paper examines the 
case for UNCLOS. The paper focuses in particular on U.S. interests on the Arctic 
seafloor, arguing that these interests are extensive and that accession would help 
avert a wide range of potential political, legal, and regulatory challenges from foreign 
governments and corporations. The possibility of such challenges creates political 
and legal uncertainty as long as the United States remains outside the convention and 
provides a bona fide disincentive for U.S.-licensed corporations to undertake the type  
of exploration and development activities necessary to realize a host of offshore 
benefits. Moreover, by staying outside UNCLOS, the United States is forfeiting an 
opportunity to reinforce a favorable Arctic legal regime that could face pressure from 
non-Arctic nations in the future. The paper concludes by recommending that the 
U.S. accede to UNCLOS at the soonest opportunity.
The Intersection of U.S Arctic Interests and UNCLOS
UNCLOS establishes maritime zones with principles and rules relevant to the world’s 
entire maritime domain, addressing topics ranging from suppression of piracy 
to conservation of fish stocks to construction of artificial islands at sea. With its 
seventeen parts, 320 articles, nine annexes, and a supplementary special agreement 
on deep seabed mining, UNCLOS touches nearly every conceivable U.S. maritime 
interest in the Arctic. Understanding this intersection is critical for evaluating the 
convention’s potential as an instrument of U.S. Arctic policy.
Freedom of Navigation
As a nation with global maritime interests, the United States has consistently viewed 
the UNCLOS provisions on freedom of navigation on the high seas and in exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs), “transit passage” through straits used for international 
navigation, and “innocent passage” through territorial seas as the convention’s 
essential core.12 Although UNCLOS’ navigation provisions were not designed with the 
Arctic in mind per se, the provisions are consistent with the United States’ interest 
in freedom of navigation in and through the Arctic.13
Although experts differ on the imminence and extent of regular Arctic transits, some 
scientific studies suggest that increasing temperatures will result in a seasonally 
ice-free Arctic as early as the 2030s.14 As the ice recedes, many expect the opening 
of more expeditious travel routes,15 with consequences for international security and 
commercial activities.16 In particular, two trans-Arctic routes are expected to become 
increasingly critical: the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route.17
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The Northern Sea Route refers to the routes running along the northern coasts of 
Eurasia and Siberia between the Barents Sea and the Chukchi Sea.18 As of June 6, 2013, 
the Northern Sea Route Commission approved fifty-four vessels to use the Northern 
Sea Route during the 2013 summer.19 The number of vessels using the Northern Sea 
Route since 2010 has increased tenfold.20 The Northwest Passage connects Baffin Bay 
and Davis Strait in the Atlantic to the Beaufort Sea in the Arctic and includes all routes 
along the northern coast of North America through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.21 
Both routes connect the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans through the Bering Strait,22 
and they have the potential to decrease the travel distance between Europe and 
Asia by up to 5,200 nautical miles.23 Although the presence of seasonal ice limits the 
regular use of these navigational routes, both Arctic- and non-Arctic-states seek to 
use these waters more frequently.24
The lucrative navigation potential of these routes must be balanced against 
environmental protection. Canada claims the waters that comprise the Northwest 
Passage as its internal waters.25 Russia claims the waters of several straits along the 
Northern Sea Route as internal waters and applies Article 234, pertaining to ice-
covered areas of the EEZ, to the rest of the route.26 The United States, among other 
nations, has consistently disagreed with these claims,27 arguing that these routes 
should be governed by the legal regime of transit passage through straits used for 
international navigation.28
Both Canada and the Russian Federation have enacted regulations that the United 
States believes amount to unwarranted restrictions on the right of transit passage. 
Canada, for example, imposed a mandatory ship reporting and vessel traffic service 
system (NORDREG) that governs transit through the Northwest Passage.29 NORDREG 
covers Canada’s EEZ and the several Northwest Passage routes in the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago.30 Canada specifically cites UNCLOS Article 234 to justify NORDREG, 
asserting that the reporting requirements are to prevent and reduce marine pollution 
from vessels in the delicate Arctic waters.31 Similarly, the Russian Federation has 
historically limited transit passage in the Northern Sea Route,32 using UNCLOS 
Article 234 to justify the limitations,33 and has recently implemented more extensive 
unilateral regulations to ensure shipping safety and environmental protection.34 With 
receding amounts of ice for significant portions of the year, whether the Northwest 
Passage or the Northern Sea Route meets Article 234’s climatic requirements for ice-
covered areas is debatable.35
Under UNCLOS, coastal states seeking to prescribe sea-lanes and traffic separation 
schemes in straits used for international navigation must receive approval by a 
“competent international organization” prior to adoption.36 The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) fills this role. The United States is working with other Arctic 
nations through the IMO to create a mandatory “Polar Code” that will cover all 
matters relevant to ships operating in both Arctic waters and the waters surrounding 
Antarctica.37 The IMO recently announced that the Polar Code will be operational as 
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early as 2015 and will be implemented by 2016.38 The extent to which the Polar Code 
reconciles Russian and Canadian interests in regulating the Northern Sea Route and 
Northwest Passage with freedom of navigation interests will be critical.
Environmental Protection
No nation, including the United States, disputes the moral and economic imperative 
to protect the Arctic’s pristine environment. The United States understands the 
fragility of the region and the need to practice responsible stewardship while 
pursuing its Arctic interests.39 UNCLOS plays a prominent but not exclusive role 
in this regard.
UNCLOS creates an obligation to “protect and preserve the marine environment.”40 
However, it avoids specific rules or standards in favor of creating zones of regulatory 
competence and providing a framework of principles designed to encourage the 
creation of more specific rules and standards through domestic regulation and 
separate international agreements.
UNCLOS provides states with exclusive, sovereign jurisdiction to regulate the 
environment within their territorial sea.41 States also have sovereign rights “for 
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources . . . of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its 
subsoil,”42 and “jurisdiction . . . with regard to . . . the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment” in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).43 In exercising 
rights and performing duties in the EEZ, coastal states must do so with “due 
regard” for the rights and duties of other states,44 not the least of which is freedom 
of navigation.
In addition to the IMO Polar Code discussed above, several international environmental 
agreements and guidelines augment UNCLOS. The International Convention for the  
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), a treaty implemented by the IMO 
(Marpol is short for marine pollution and 73/78 stands for the years 1973 and 1978), 
governs the regulation, reduction, and prevention of ship pollution caused by 
operational or accidental activities.45 The Arctic Council ministers recently signed the 
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in 
the Arctic that created a regional response plan to cooperatively address oil spills 
in the Arctic.46 The Arctic Council has also created working groups, particularly the 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group (PAME), to research and 
create reports about environmental concerns unique to the Arctic.47 PAME previously 
issued a report that studied the potential effects increased shipping will have on 
the Arctic, suggesting ways by which states could prevent environmental harm,48 
and provided advisory guidelines for offshore oil and gas production in the Arctic.49 
PAME’s 2013–2015 agenda includes determining the adequacy of international and 
regional commitments concerning environmental protection and promoting their 
implementation and compliance.50
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Fishing
UNCLOS serves as the international foundation for fisheries management, giving 
coastal states sovereign rights over natural resources in their EEZs, a duty to 
conserve and the right to utilize fish stocks, and a duty to cooperate with other 
countries in the management of certain fish stocks.51 The 1995 United Nations Fish 
Stocks Agreement,52 to which the United States is a party, provides a precautionary 
approach to fisheries and encourages regional cooperation in management of fisheries 
in the high seas.53 Although UNCLOS does not provide a detailed regime through 
which state parties must manage fisheries, it provides a broad framework that 
encourages multilateral approaches to sustainable development of fish stocks.54
Several factors, including ice cover, cold water temperatures, and low primary 
production prevent the development of commercial fish stocks in the central Arctic 
Ocean.55 The seas surrounding the Arctic Ocean, however, contain large, globally 
important fish stocks, constituting more than 10 percent of global marine fish catches 
by weight and equaling billions of dollars in economic value.56 Compared to most 
major international commercial fisheries, Arctic fisheries are comparatively well-
managed due to the extensive regime of fisheries regulations that affect the Arctic.57 
Four international or multilateral agreements, eight regional agreements, and four 
bilateral agreements each affect different areas of the Arctic, different types of 
fish, and different Arctic nations.58 The Arctic Council’s biodiversity working group 
released a report stating that the illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fisheries 
were a problem several years ago, but with UNCLOS and “substantial improvement in 
cooperation,” IUU fishing has decreased in the oceans surrounding the Arctic.59
Marine Scientific Research
As most of the Arctic Ocean has not been explored, one of the U.S. policy goals in 
the Arctic is to increase understanding through scientific research.60 Currently, the 
foremost scientific research interest for the United States is to obtain data regarding 
the geologic composition of the continental margin. In addition, the United States is 
pursuing research in climate variability, Arctic marine ecosystems, oil spill effects, 
and unconventional energy and mineral resources.61 Marine Scientific Research (MSR) 
in Russian arctic waters, where Russia has the longest Arctic coastline, is hampered 
by Russian reluctance to permit U.S. researchers access to Russian waters.
The United States has long accepted the UNCLOS regime for marine scientific 
research. UNCLOS gives coastal states exclusive control over scientific research 
in the territorial sea.62 Coastal states also have extensive rights in the EEZ, including 
the right to reject a request by a foreign nation or company for access to its EEZ 
or continental shelf if the project is of direct significance for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources63 or involves drilling into the continental shelf, 
the use of explosives, or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine 
environment.64 The convention provides all states the right to conduct marine scientific 
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research in the high seas.65 A state’s ability to perform scientific research in the area 
is subject to the provisions of Part XI, the deep seabed mining regime.66 Article 143 
states that all member states can conduct marine scientific research in the area, 
but they must provide the results of their research and analysis to the international 
community through the International Seabed Authority.67
Seafloor Resources
The United States has significant potential interests on the Arctic seafloor. In 
the Obama Administration’s May 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the 
administration stated that energy security is a “core component of [U.S.] national 
security strategy” and by responsibly developing the Arctic’s proved and potential 
oil and gas resources, the United States will reduce reliance on foreign oil.68 UNCLOS 
provides detailed rules and procedures regulating activity on the seafloor.
UNCLOS and the Continental Shelf
UNCLOS provides that nations enjoy sovereign rights to the water column as well as 
the living and non-living resources of the ocean floor to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles from the coastal baseline.69 The sovereign right to explore and develop 
resources in this area, known as the continental shelf, is also considered customary 
international law.70 UNCLOS, however, introduced several important new elements that 
govern a state’s ability to extend its exclusive sovereign rights to explore and develop 
its continental shelf resources.
The term “continental shelf” as used in UNCLOS refers to the geologic continental 
margin made up of the geologic shelf, the geologic slope, and the geologic rise.71 
UNCLOS specifically defines the continental shelf as either “the natural prolongation 
of land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin” or 200 miles from a 
coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater.72 When a coastal state’s continental 
margin extends farther than the 200–nautical mile limit imposed by customary 
international law, UNCLOS provides that a nation may exercise sovereign rights over 
the seabed floor beyond 200 nautical miles73 in the area known as the “extended 
continental shelf.”74 The treaty includes two formulas to determine the outer limits 
of continental margins75 and two methods to set constraint lines past which coastal 
states cannot claim sovereignty.76
UNCLOS also provides a process through which coastal states can reduce the 
potential for dispute and uncertainty over their continental margins’ limits. This 
is particularly important in the Arctic where the U.S. extended continental shelf 
likely overlaps with that of both the Russian Federation and Canada. Under UNCLOS 
Article 76, a coastal state may obtain international recognition for the outer limits of 
its claim to an extended continental shelf by submitting a claim to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).77 The CLCS consists of twenty-one 
elected experts in geology, geophysics, or hydrography, and may only be nationals 
of UNCLOS State parties.78 A coastal state must gather scientific and technical data 
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that describes the characteristics of the seabed and subsoil and submit its claim to 
the CLCS within ten years of becoming a party to UNCLOS.79 A seven-member CLCS 
subcommittee then analyzes the data and prepares “recommendations” regarding 
the outer limits of the continental shelf.80 The recommendations must be approved 
by a two-thirds majority of CLCS members.81 If the coastal state agrees to the 
approved recommendations, the limits are “final and binding” on the international 
community.82
There have been sixty-six extended continental shelf submissions to the CLCS made 
by fifty-four member states to date.83 This process takes several years to complete 
and it is anticipated that the CLCS will not render decisions on some submissions 
(for example, those submitted in 2010 or later) until as late as 2030.84
Pursuant to Article 77.3, the coastal state is entitled to explore and develop the 
resources of its extended continental shelf, subject to the royalty provisions set 
forth in Article 82. Article 82.1 mandates that a state make annual payments with 
respect to its exploitation of non-living resources on its extended continental 
shelf. Beginning in the sixth year of production, payments are made starting at 
the rate of 1 percent of the total value of production at each site, increasing by 
1 percent each year until the twelfth year when the payment plateaus at 7 percent 
of production value for every year thereafter.85
Payments are submitted to the International Seabed Authority (ISA or “Authority”),86 
the UNCLOS-created body that regulates the exploration for and exploitation of the 
natural resources in the area.87 The ISA distributes the royalties based on the needs 
and interests of UNCLOS member states, but has no other involvement in the 
extended continental shelf development process.88
The potential implications of this extended continental shelf regime are profound. 
With one of the largest coastlines in the world, the United States is expected to 
have over 291,000 square miles of extended continental shelf.89 The U.S. continental 
margin off the coast of Alaska alone may extend to a minimum of 600 miles from the 
Alaskan baseline.90 Alaska’s extended continental shelf lies over the Arctic Alaska 
province, one of the many oil- and gas-rich basins in the Arctic.91 It is estimated that 
there may be almost 73 billion barrels of oil and oil-equivalent natural gas located in 
the Arctic Alaska province, the second highest estimated production capability of all 
Arctic provinces.92 The continental shelf within the 200-mile EEZ under the Beaufort 
and Chukchi Seas alone may have over 23 billion barrels of oil and 104 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas.93 Not only would development of these resources promote energy 
independence, a U.S. national security objective,94 it would also create almost 55,000 
jobs per year nationwide and generate over $193 billion in federal, state, and local 
revenue over a fifty-year period.95 Due to delays in Arctic oil and gas exploration 
in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, both within the U.S. 200-mile EEZ, the earliest 
estimated date of extraction is sometime after 2019.96
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Gaining exclusive sovereign rights over the full potential U.S. Arctic extended 
continental shelf will prove difficult, however, due to the close proximity among the 
United States, Russia, and Canada and the potential for overlapping claims to extended 
continental shelves. The Russian Federation was the first UNCLOS party to submit 
an extended continental shelf claim to the CLCS.97 The CLCS rejected Russia’s initial 
2001 submission but permitted it to revise and resubmit its claim. Russia anticipates 
submitting its revised claim for its extended shelf in the Arctic by the end of the 
year.98 Denmark, Iceland, and Norway also submitted claims to the CLCS99 and Canada 
must do so by December 2013.100 This will leave the United States as the only Arctic 
nation that has not formally claimed the outer limits of an extended continental shelf. 
Moreover, if Russia accepts the commission’s recommendations, Russia’s extended 
continental shelf boundaries are final and binding (although it is not clear who is so 
bound). If the United States accedes and eventually perfects a claim to the outer limit 
of its extended shelf with the CLCS, there is a chance that its extended continental 
shelf will overlap with Russia’s. UNCLOS allows for two (or more) legitimate outer limit 
claims but leaves it to the parties to agree to terms that split the overlapping extended 
continental shelf between them. The United States has provided observations on 
submissions by two other states, but, as a non-party, it cannot submit a claim under 
Article 76.101
UNCLOS and the Deep Seabed UNCLOS provides that the seabed floor beyond 
the limits of a coastal state’s continental shelf or extended continental shelf is 
beyond national jurisdiction and comprises, in UNCLOS parlance, the “Area.”102 
The Area is governed by its own legal regime designed to balance the interests of 
coastal states with commercial and scientific interests in the deep seabed beyond 
national jurisdiction with those of the entire international community. The Area 
has been set aside as the “common heritage of mankind.”103 UNCLOS Part XI and 
the subsequent Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS104 
(“Part XI Agreement”) outline a U.S.-friendly deep seabed mining regime that permits 
member States to acquire legal title to non-living natural resources in the Area.
UNCLOS created the International Seabed Authority to implement the Part XI deep 
seabed mining regime. The ISA has three principle organs: the secretariat, the 
assembly, and the council.105 The secretariat is made up of the secretary general, who 
is elected for four-year terms, and his small staff.106 The assembly, comprised of all 
UNCLOS member states,107gives final approval to rules and regulations regarding the 
deep seabed mining regime, decides how to distribute the royalties received from 
extended continental shelf projects, and elects the council.108
The council is the most important body within the authority and serves as the 
executive organ of the ISA.109 It is made up of thirty-six member states110 and is 
responsible for inter alia, “exercis[ing] control over activities in the Area”111 and for 
recommending to the assembly “rules, regulations, and procedures on the equitable 
sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area 
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and the payments and contributions made pursuant to Article 82.”112 The assembly 
may not approve financial payments unless recommended by the Council.113 If the 
assembly disagrees with the council’s recommendations, the issue will be returned 
to the council for further deliberations.114 If the United States accedes to UNCLOS, 
the United States would be the only state guaranteed a permanent seat on the 
council.115 Moreover, given UNCLOS-mandated voting procedures that are based on 
consensus,116 the United States would have the irrevocable ability to veto any ISA 
plan to distribute funds or financial assistance in a manner inconsistent with U.S. 
desires.117
Activities in the Area are permitted pursuant to a multi-step approval process 
detailed in UNCLOS Article 153, Annex III, and the Part XI Agreement. Interested 
parties may prospect118 without prior approval from the authority; however, they 
must inform the authority of their actions.119 Prospecting confers no legal rights 
over the resources.120 To explore and exploit the Area’s natural resources, state 
parties or entities sponsored by state parties must submit a comprehensive 
application to the authority121 along with a processing fee.122 The authority issues 
decisions on applications in the order it receives them. First, the Legal and 
Technical Commission (LTC) reviews applications and makes recommendations to 
the council on the approval of work plans.123 If the LTC recommends approval of a 
plan, the Council must approve it within sixty days unless the Council decides by 
two-thirds majority to reject it.124 The council also can approve a plan that the LTC 
otherwise rejects.125
The ISA recognizes environmental protection of the Area to be of paramount 
importance as the prospect of deep seabed mining increases. UNCLOS requires 
the ISA Council to adopt rules, regulations, and procedures to ensure protection 
of the marine environment from the hazardous effects that may result from deep 
seabed mining activities.126 Each application submitted to the authority must include 
a detailed Environmental Impact Statement “that provides full documentation of all 
environmental and social issues” and describes the effects mining in a particular area 
will have on the marine environment.127 The council can disapprove of the exploitation 
of areas where there is a risk of serious harm from mining activities even if the 
mining activities have already begun.128
There are a variety of deep seabed resources over which the United States could 
potentially exert control if it accedes to UNCLOS. The United States could have 
access to the mineral-rich deposits of polymetallic sulfides found near hydrothermal 
vents, including the Gakkel Ridge and other vents already found in the Arctic.129 
Hydrothermal vents are hosts to a myriad of marine species that make development 
environmentally hazardous; however, the potential to recover valuable minerals 
such as gold, copper, manganese, and others make it an attractive risk.130 The ISA has 
announced it will begin issuing licenses for nodule production from hydrothermal 
vents as early as 2016.131
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Once all Arctic nations establish the outer limits of their extended continental shelves, 
there will remain only a small portion of the Arctic that will qualify as the “common 
heritage of mankind.” At this point in time it is unclear what resources, if any, would 
remain for the common heritage of mankind in the Arctic. However, United States 
accession to UNCLOS would significantly advance its ability to stake an internationally 
recognized claim to these resources if any resources are discovered in the future. 
In the meantime, U.S. corporations interested in mining the deep seabed have been 
forced to establish subsidiaries in state parties, with an opportunity cost to the 
U.S. Treasury.132
The Case against UNCLOS
As discussed in section 1, the United States has significant interests in the Arctic, all of 
which UNCLOS purports to regulate, at least to some degree. The nearly coterminous 
overlay of UNCLOS with U.S. Arctic interests leads to the fundamental policy question: 
how would U.S. interests in the Arctic be affected if the United States accedes to 
UNCLOS?
The Argument that UNCLOS Is Harmful
UNCLOS critics have long argued that any benefits the convention might provide 
are more than offset by its negative effects. Although this overarching argument is 
not focused on the Arctic per se, its supporting points have shown resiliency in the 
broader UNCLOS debate and have important Arctic implications.
One of the most prominent arguments is that the convention’s royalty provisions133 
have the potential to drain billions of dollars from the U.S. economy by “taxing” 
potential U.S. corporate profits. As claimed by Senator James M. Inhofe:
For the first time in U.S. history, [UNCLOS] will create an international body 
that can tax this country. . . . [Royalties] will go from the U.S. Treasury to an 
international group located in Kingston, Jamaica. . . . There could be billions, 
if not trillions, in resources in the Extended Continental Shelf (ECS). Using 
a conservative estimate of $1 trillion, that would mean $70 billion lost from 
the United States.134
Opponents argue that U.S. royalty payments will go to an inefficient and corrupt  
“UN-style bureaucracy”135 and that the United States will lose control over the 
money upon transfer to the ISA.136 As former Senator Jim DeMint asked, “how is it 
in the interests of the United States to turn the royalties over to an unaccountable 
international bureaucracy [when the royalties] will be distributed to countries 
that may be our enemies, like Sudan.”137
These arguments have proven a successful rallying point for UNCLOS opponents and 
a potential political millstone for senators who might otherwise be inclined to support 
the convention. The arguments have retained force despite the fact that the United 
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States itself originally conceived the royalty plan under the Nixon Administration, 
with the full support of U.S. industry—support that has remained consistent across 
nearly four decades. Royalties were proposed as a modest concession in return for 
agreement on the U.S.-sponsored extended continental shelf regime.138 Indeed, most 
of the oil and gas that may be recovered would be in the first six years and thus would 
not ever be subject to royalty payments. The “UN-style bureaucracy” argument has 
also endured despite the fact that opponents have presented no evidence that the ISA 
is either inefficient, overstaffed, or corrupt at any time throughout the nearly 19 years 
since its founding in 1994.
The argument that the ISA could transfer U.S. contributions to terrorists and other 
anti-U.S. interests also has great emotional appeal. However, the assertion is not 
based on fact139 and has been rebutted repeatedly.140 UNCLOS opponents have 
suggested in direct contradiction of the convention’s express terms that the assembly 
might somehow be able to circumvent the express provisions preserving U.S. 
influence in the council. The argument is spurious but remains a pillar of opposition 
strategy. Fortunately, to date the ISA has not yet taken up implementation of Article 82. 
But only if the United States is a party can it ensure that payments would not go to 
terrorists or other anti-U.S. interests.
The Argument that UNCLOS Is Unnecessary
In addition to arguing that UNCLOS membership would hurt the United States, 
UNCLOS opponents argue that the convention is unnecessary in the first place. As 
Alaskan Senator Lisa Murkowski has noted:
There are some who do not see the point in joining the rest of the world in 
ratifying the treaty. They say the United States already enjoys the benefits . . . 
even though we are not a member, and that by not becoming a party to 
the treaty, we can pick and choose which sections we abide by, while not 
subjecting our actions to international review. I respectfully disagree.141
Although Senator Murkowski and other UNCLOS proponents may disagree, the 
argument that UNCLOS is unnecessary remains potent because it offers an easy 
resolution for an overburdened political system. If, as opponents argue, the United 
States can accomplish its objectives without joining UNCLOS, why invest premium 
political capital and legislative time on a treaty that has failed to energize a 
supportive electoral constituency?
In making the case that UNCLOS is unnecessary, opponents do not dispute that the 
convention provides certain benefits. Rather, opponents argue that the benefits are 
independently available through other means, such as customary international law, 
separate bilateral or multilateral international agreements, or the exercise of U.S. 
military power. Opponents consider the convention’s benefits gratuitous and not 
worth the alleged burdens of UNCLOS membership.
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The ease by which the United States has been able to enjoy some UNCLOS benefits 
around the world has, in fact, helped reinforce opposition arguments that accession 
is unnecessary. While the United States’ thirty-year practice of operating consistent 
with UNCLOS has contributed to a maritime environment advantageous to U.S. global 
interests, the very stability of the regime also allows UNCLOS opponents to claim that 
U.S. accession is unnecessary. As discussed below, UNCLOS opponents contend the 
United States may, in effect, have its cake and eat it too.
Unnecessary for Interests in the Ocean The primary and most obvious example of 
the argument above is made with respect to navigational freedoms. For decades, the 
United States has been a leading advocate of strict adherence to UNCLOS’ navigation 
provisions, having lobbied aggressively for their inclusion during the convention’s 
negotiation. Through three decades, successive U.S. presidents have directed—with 
the complete support of the U.S. armed forces—that the military operate in accord 
with UNCLOS provisions. Likewise, other departments and agencies have pursued 
pro-UNCLOS policies and complementary international agreements as well.
Indeed, the United States has also done more than comply with UNCLOS; it has 
asserted that UNCLOS’ navigational provisions represent customary international law 
binding on the entire international community regardless of any state’s failure to ratify 
the convention.142 Although there are exceptions, most UNCLOS member states comply 
with the navigation provisions or at least do not challenge U.S. vessels exercising 
UNCLOS-based navigational rights.143
In the Arctic, UNCLOS’ navigation provisions provide a useful paradigm for free 
navigation.144 Both Russia and Canada have taken positions the U.S. maintains are 
inconsistent with UNCLOS’ freedom of navigation norms in their respective efforts to 
maximize control over the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage.145 Although the 
United States could reinforce UNCLOS’ beneficial provisions of transit and innocent 
passage by joining the Convention, there is little evidence that U.S. accession would 
change Russian or Canadian positions or result in a dramatic shift in third country 
positions absent being induced to do so by an international tribunal. Likewise, to 
the extent free navigation norms are actually respected in the Arctic, it is difficult to 
imagine how the United States’ failure to join UNCLOS will prevent the United States 
from enjoying these benefits, although how long that respect will continue is uncertain 
if it comes under increasing pressures to change the law of the sea regime. The same 
could be said of environmental protection, fishing, and marine scientific research 
benefits.
UNCLOS supporters naturally resist such arguments as shortsighted.146 Supporters 
note, among other arguments, that as a non-party, the United States has no 
recourse to the dispute settlement procedures of Part XV to address issues in the 
aforementioned areas. The fact remains, however, that during the thirty years 
UNCLOS has been in force, the United States has, in many respects, successfully 
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played the role of “free rider,” enjoying benefits codified in, and sometimes introduced 
by, the convention. To UNCLOS opponents, this is as it should be: sovereign states 
should be able to enjoy UNCLOS benefits at will unless and until member states 
attempt to limit the benefits or modify the norms that favor U.S. interests today. 
Should such efforts arise, opponents insist that the United States should respond by 
using traditional means of state diplomatic, economic, or political power. However, the 
United States as a non-party will not be in a position to prevent any changes that will 
be contrary to U.S. interests in the benefits it now enjoys.
Unnecessary for Interests on the Ocean Floor UNCLOS opponents also argue that 
convention membership is unnecessary for the United States to achieve its interests 
on the seafloor. Opponents contend that the United States already has the domestic 
and international legal authority necessary to proceed with offshore exploration and 
exploitation as far from shore as desired, limited only by technology and profit 
margin. UNCLOS opponents argue that the 1945 Truman Proclamation, the 1953 Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, and the 
1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA) provide all necessary legal 
authority.147 In light of these authorities, UNCLOS is said to be irrelevant.
Several scholars have demonstrated that the opponents’ argument for what is, in 
effect, an open seafloor is, in the words of John Norton Moore and John Norton 
Garrett, “false and a disservice to the Senate.”148 Moore, Garrett, and others have 
convincingly refuted the argument that the United States currently has the legal 
authority necessary for unlimited exploitation of the non-living natural resources of 
the extended continental shelf and beyond. These scholars demonstrate that where 
U.S. statutes and the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf refer to the “continental 
shelf,” each is in fact referring to the U.S. “geologic shelf,” which extends no more 
than approximately 50 miles off the U.S. coast.149 Thus, Ronald Reagan’s claim to a 
continental shelf of 200 miles, which is identical to what UNCLOS permits, stands as 
the most expansive claim in U.S. history.150
The only circumstance in which UNCLOS opponents recognize a limit on the United 
States’ authority to exploit the seafloor is when a U.S. neighbor can also make a 
legitimate claim to a potential extended continental shelf that overlaps with the 
U.S. claim. In these cases, UNCLOS opponents suggest that the United States may 
enter bilateral agreements with its neighbors to resolve the potential conflict, and 
these agreements would be conclusive between the parties. Under this view, the 
international community has no right in the matter.151
The obvious—and only—example of such a U.S. bilateral agreement to date is the 
U.S-Mexican agreement for an extended continental shelf boundary in the Gulf of 
Mexico’s Western Gap, a 6,600 square-mile area beyond the 200-mile limits of both 
the United States and Mexico’s respective continental shelves.152 However, because 
this “gap” outside the limits of each nation’s continental shelf encompassed the 
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overlapping territory of each nation’s potential extended continental shelf, the two 
neighbors successfully negotiated a compromise. Subsequent to the agreement, the 
U.S. Department of the Interior, as of June 2012, had granted sixty-five licenses to nine 
companies.153 Each of the licenses contains a proviso that the company will pay the 
equivalent of an UNCLOS royalty.154 Further, the outer limits of Mexico’s extended 
continental shelf in the Western Gap of the Gulf of Mexico has been blessed by the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and Mexico has accepted those 
recommendations.155 The internationally recognized outer limit thus is the Mexico-
United States continental shelf boundary in the Western Gap.
The Western Gap agreement has clear implications for the Arctic, where the United 
States shares a potential extended continental shelf with both Russia and Canada. 
UNCLOS opponents suggest that questions regarding international legal title to the 
U.S. potential extended continental shelf in the Arctic will be resolved conclusively 
when the United States enters bilateral agreements with Russian and Canada 
respectively.156 As simple and therefore attractive as this position may be, it begs 
several questions.
Under what legal authority would the Arctic neighbors have the right to divide 
and claim for themselves an area lying, at least in theory, beyond their respective 
national jurisdictions? Even assuming a legitimate legal basis to claim their extended 
continental shelves and delimit them bilaterally, what basis would the states have 
for desiring to and concluding their agreements outside the UNCLOS framework, 
including ignoring Article 82 royalty payments? Finally, even if Russia and Canada—
both UNCLOS member states—choose to comply with UNCLOS on their respective 
sides of delimited shelves, might they object to the United States not doing so on 
its side, and, if so, would they pursue their objections? And how might the outer 
limits of the U.S. extended continental shelf in the Arctic be determined given the 
geographic differences from the Western Gap situation where there were only two 
geographically opposite states with no third state or area interests involved?
The simple answer is that only by acceding to the convention can the United States 
obtain its full continental shelf rights in the Arctic.
The Case for UNCLOS: The Need for Legal Certainty
As demonstrated above, the argument that the United States has legal authority 
to proceed outside UNCLOS with projects beyond the 200-mile continental shelf is 
flawed. U.S. industry has consistently said as much, arguing that UNCLOS membership 
is required to provide the “legal certainty” necessary for exploration and exploitation 
of the resources of the full extended continental shelf and beyond.157
While its calls for “legal certainty” have been unequivocal and enthusiastic, industry 
has been less specific in articulating what the risks might be of proceeding without 
the desired certainty. Industry representatives may consider the risks obvious to 
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anyone with a basic understanding of large-scale capital investment. They may also 
believe that simple statements of support for UNCLOS should be sufficient to generate 
desired political outcomes. Whatever the reason, the minimalist explanations 
have allowed UNCLOS opponents to speculate that industry’s advocacy may, in 
fact, have shallow roots.
UNCLOS opponent former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has suggested 
that businesses constantly make cost-benefit analyses, and have simply decided, 
at least for the time being, that the time is not right for offshore investment.158 In 
the meantime, “they want as much certainty as they can get.”159 To secure this legal 
certainty, Mr. Rumsfeld has offered an alternative to waiting for the United States to 
accede to the treaty, suggesting that U.S. companies pursue “joint ventures” with 
other UNCLOS member states to secure legal title to deep seabed mining.160 In fact, at 
least one U.S. company has already pursued this route.161 Apart from the philosophical 
inconsistency in encouraging U.S. corporations to participate in a legal regime the 
United States rejects, there may be opportunity costs to encouraging U.S. companies 
to obtain security of tenure to drill in the deep seabed through licenses backed by 
other countries.162
Informally, opponents have gone further, suggesting that industry representatives may 
be overstating the “certainty” argument out of ignorance, or even a desire to curry 
political favor with powerful pro-UNCLOS policymakers and legislators.163 Given how 
central the “legal certainty” argument has become to industry support for UNCLOS, a 
more detailed analysis of the need for “legal certainty” is essential.
In making the case for UNCLOS, industry has consistently expressed the concern 
that someone might challenge legal title to a particular site or extracted resource 
not obtained through the UNCLOS process.164 UNCLOS opponents have countered by 
predicting there will be little opposition if and when a corporation actually begins 
production pursuant to a U.S. license outside UNCLOS.165 Much is made, for example, 
of the fact that no party to date has challenged licenses granted on the U.S. side of the 
U.S.-Mexican Western Gap. UNCLOS opponents imply that the absence of a challenge 
suggests that the international community is sanguine with U.S. licensing outside the 
UNCLOS process. However, the Western Gap example is isolated and inapplicable 
as demonstrated above, and in any case, hardly seems a rigorous test, given that no 
company has actually begun exploration in the Western Gap and all U.S. licensees 
have agreed to pay an UNCLOS royalty.166
Because no industry is currently producing on a U.S.-licensed site, neither opponents 
nor supporters can predict with certainty how interested third parties might react 
when production begins and profits are taken. In the meantime, however, to suggest 
that no actor besides the United States’ border-sharing neighbors will be concerned 
seems naïve. Given that UNCLOS member states have voluntarily created a seafloor 
regime in which rights and benefits are contingent on beneficiaries fulfilling significant 
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obligations,167 member states, at a minimum, have an interest in preventing free-riding 
on, and circumvention of, this system. Others may have similar interests as well.
Potential Challengers
Who might see fit to challenge the actions of a seafloor free rider like the United 
States? To begin, UNCLOS member states have obvious interests in the integrity of 
the continental shelf and seabed regimes in which they invest. Potentially interested 
states fall into at least three categories. First are states that may have an interest in 
conducting commercial activity of their own in an area claimed by the U.S. but not 
ratified through the UNCLOS process. Second are states that might have no objection, 
per se, to U.S. activity, but wish to ensure the United States pays its fair share under 
UNCLOS for the privilege of conducting commercial activity. Third are states that 
stand to benefit from the Article 82 “equitable sharing” payments and seek to ensure 
such payments are maximized.
In addition to UNCLOS member states, corporations with commercial interests in the 
seabed floor may have an interest in ensuring that actual and potential competitors do 
not obtain an unfair competitive advantage by operating outside the UNCLOS system. 
Although Article 82 royalties are assessed to states, it seems reasonable to assume 
that corporations may be assessed extended continental shelf fees by their licensing-
states. Likewise, if operating in the area, corporations required to abide by rules 
and regulations established to govern the area would presumably demand that their 
competitors be bound by the same rules.
Similarly, the ISA, created by UNCLOS to “organize and control activities in the 
Area” and to distribute economic assistance and Article 82 royalty payments, would 
have an interest in preserving the integrity of the system it was created to oversee. 
Importantly, the ISA has been vested with international legal personality, which 
includes the power to bring suit to enforce its interests.168
Finally, enterprising NGOs might take a keen interest in whether a state and its 
licensees are profiting at the expense of developing and land-locked states protected 
by UNCLOS, or, whether states and licensees are complying with ISA regulations 
created to protect the marine environment in and around the common heritage 
of mankind. The most obvious targets for NGO disapproval and legal or political 
action would seem to be the states and corporations operating outside the economic 
assistance and environmental protection regimes created by UNCLOS.
Potential Legal Actions
Any of the actors noted above could be expected to take a critical view of U.S. 
attempts to avoid the UNCLOS seafloor regime. Obviously, international disapproval 
of particular U.S. policies is not new; however, disapproval takes on magnified 
importance if opponents are able to channel their grievances into meaningful 
legal challenges. Given that the public international law of the sea governs how 
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states and international organizations relate to each other in the maritime domain, 
the inquiry into potential legal rights and remedies logically begins with public 
international law.169
International Law 
Liability Public international law governs the relationships between states and, 
on occasion, the relationships of states to international organizations. Nations 
commonly assume obligations to each other through treaties; however, a state may 
be bound by a norm of customary international law notwithstanding its failure to 
enter a treaty. Customary international law is created in a variety of ways, including 
by treaty provisions adopted and followed by sufficiently large numbers of states as 
a matter of legal obligation. Customary international legal obligations also give rise 
to an array of international remedies. Thus, the fact that the United States has not 
ratified UNCLOS does not necessarily mean the United States is free—as a matter of 
international law—to ignore particular UNCLOS legal norms or processes. If, in fact, 
the United States is under an obligation to comply with an UNCLOS provision that 
has also become customary international law, failure to comply could give rise to 
international liability and subject the United States to international legal remedies.
There is a strong case to be made that the United States is obligated under 
international law to comply with UNCLOS’ seafloor regime despite the fact that the 
United States has never ratified the convention. The most fundamental and compelling 
reason the United States is bound by UNCLOS’ regime for the extended continental 
shelf is because, quite simply, the United States says it is bound.170 Moreover, even 
though the United States has not ratified the convention, as a signatory to the revised 
deep seabed mining provisions, the United States has incurred an international legal 
obligation to not act contrary to the “object and purpose” of the treaty.171 In light of 
the prominent role given the deep seabed mining regime in the convention and its 
necessary and practically inseparable relationship to the extended continental shelf 
regime, the United States is arguably not permitted to act in any way that would 
undermine these central provisions.
Even if a future president were to disavow the U.S. signature of the deep seabed 
agreement, the U.S. government’s current position, which reflects its long held view, 
would be used as evidence that the provisions have gained the status of customary 
international law binding on the United States The U.S. failure to contest this 
proposition—indeed, the U.S. long agreement with the proposition—is reinforced 
by the fact that 85 percent of nation states, including all but fourteen littoral nations, 
have ratified UNCLOS.
Actual state practice also reinforces the legitimacy of the extended continental shelf 
regime in international law and its status as customary international law. To date, 
sixty-five nations have submitted claims to the CLCS, demonstrating widespread 
acceptance of this critical UNCLOS process.172
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Thus, it may well be that the United States is estopped from acting contrary to the 
convention as a result of the President’s Ocean Policy Statement and subsequent 
vigorous compliance with it.
Forum and Remedy The fact that the United States could well be found liable 
under international law for failing to comply with the extended continental shelf 
regime does not end the inquiry. A state or international organization must obtain 
two separate types of jurisdiction over an opposing party. First, there must be 
jurisdiction to bring a claim in the first place; second, there must be jurisdiction 
to enforce any resulting judgment, which is commonly obtained by asserting 
control over assets of the defeated litigant.173 Jurisdiction to bring a claim does 
not necessarily mean jurisdiction to enforce a judgment. Within international law, 
there are two primary forums in which the ISA or an UNCLOS member state might 
attempt to bring and enforce a legal action against the United States for acting 
contrary to UNCLOS.
One option would be to bring an action before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). The ICJ has jurisdiction in contentious cases only on the basis of consent 
of the parties—i.e., a state cannot be sued at the ICJ unless both parties agree or 
the state being sued has already submitted to jurisdiction through a prior, binding, 
international agreement.174 In all likelihood, neither circumstance would apply to 
the United States in the UNCLOS context. Presumably, the United States would 
not consent to a specific suit. In 1985, the United States withdrew a long-standing 
declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ after the ICJ asserted 
jurisdiction in the landmark case of “Military and Paramilitary Activities In and 
Against Nicaragua.”175 Although in intervening years the United States has agreed to 
participate in certain ICJ litigation, the circumstances of those cases are sufficiently 
distinct and make them unlikely precedents for UNCLOS litigation.176 Accordingly, 
it is unlikely a state or international organization will be able to obtain jurisdiction 
over the United States for a contentious case at the ICJ.177
The fact that a contentious UNCLOS suit before the ICJ is unlikely does not, 
however, render the ICJ irrelevant. Even without consent by the United States, 
the ICJ could issue an “advisory opinion.” The UN General Assembly or the UN 
Security Council may seek an advisory opinion “on any legal question” from the 
ICJ,178 including disputes between states in which one has not consented to ICJ 
jurisdiction.179 In addition, the assembly can authorize any other organ of the UN or 
any special agency to seek an advisory opinion “on legal questions arising within 
the scope of their activities.”180 Although advisory opinions are not legally binding, 
they may, depending on the surrounding context, carry political weight. Moreover, 
such an opinion might also be employed as precedent in foreign domestic courts 
and international trade forums, or prove harmful to a corporation’s international 
reputation, each of which is discussed below.
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Another forum option could be the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), which was designed to resolve disputes between UNCLOS parties.181 As 
the United States is not an UNCLOS member state, it would presumably attempt 
to resist jurisdiction. However, given that ITLOS is empowered to decide its own 
jurisdiction182 and it has been assertive about doing so,183 that the United States has 
stated UNCLOS represents customary international law, and that the United States has 
an obligation to not defeat the “object and purpose” of a treaty it has signed, it is at 
least worth considering whether there might be a circumstance in which ITLOS might 
find jurisdiction over the United States in a contentious case involving the extended 
continental shelf or deep seabed. Even if the answer is no, it seems entirely plausible 
that ITLOS’ Seabed Disputes Chamber could issue an advisory opinion on an issue 
involving the U.S.,184 with effects similar to those outlined above for the ICJ.
Foreign Domestic Law A second potential means to compel compliance with UNCLOS 
regimes would be for a foreign state, corporation, or even an NGO to bring an action 
against the United States, or, perhaps more likely, a U.S.-licensed corporation in 
a foreign domestic jurisdiction. The enforcing party would be required to bring 
its action in a jurisdiction with domestic law incorporating UNCLOS obligations. 
Enforcement of UNCLOS in a foreign domestic court would depend on the relationship 
between treaties and the foreign nation’s domestic law.185 Nations fall into two 
categories in how they implement treaties into their domestic law. Some states 
convert treaties into domestic law automatically186 and in an UNCLOS member state 
taking such an approach, UNCLOS would be enforceable in a foreign domestic court 
without any further action required by the member state. In contrast, some nations 
require implementing legislation before a treaty is enforceable as domestic law.187 In 
such a nation, UNCLOS would either need to be made self-executing upon ratification, 
or be implemented through separate legislation.188
In either case, if a state is willing to incorporate UNCLOS provisions into its domestic 
law, it is foreseeable that the state might also insist that corporations conducting 
business within the state comply with UNCLOS. For example, state A might establish 
a rule that before corporation Z does business within A, Z must demonstrate that its 
international business is conducted consistent with UNCLOS. Further, if Z is already 
doing business within A and undertakes a new non-UNCLOS-compliant venture 
elsewhere, A might subject Z to penalties. Alternatively, A might allow private causes 
of action to be brought by third-party corporations or NGOs against Z as a way to 
compel UNCLOS compliance. Chevron, Exxon, and Coca-Cola are some of the U.S. 
corporations that have been forced to endure long and expensive litigation in a foreign 
domestic court for charges ranging from environmental pollution to human rights 
violations.189
Today, several countries have statutes mandating UNCLOS compliance. For example, 
Australia has passed the Sea and Submerged Lands Act of 1973, which gives 
domestic effect to the provisions of UNCLOS.190 This domestic legislation would 
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allow Australia to bring suit against the United States or a U.S.-licensed corporation 
in its domestic courts.
In addition to obtaining jurisdiction to bring the claim, a plaintiff hoping to obtain 
complete success must also obtain enforcement jurisdiction over the opposing party. 
This is easily accomplished if the corporation is doing business or has assets within 
the relevant jurisdiction; however, even if not, jurisdiction would not necessarily be 
foreclosed under international extraterritoriality principles. Jurisdiction might exist 
if the United States or a U.S.-licensed corporation was harming the vital economic 
interests of the plaintiff, taking action deemed to have a harmful effect within the 
foreign state’s territory, or potentially affecting the interests of the international 
community as a whole.191
To prevail against the United States, the plaintiff would need to overcome the 
presumption that the United States, as a sovereign state, is immune from civil 
jurisdiction.192 Although the law varies among states, this might be accomplished by 
relying on the commercial nature of exploration and development on the extended 
continental shelf and deep seabed. Typically, to determine if something is commercial, 
one must look to the nature of the conduct rather than to the purpose. The economic 
development of new waters backed with modern technology and investment is 
certainly commercial in nature.
International Reputation
The survey above suggests a variety of legal means through which the United States 
or a U.S.-licensed corporation might be challenged for operations on the seafloor 
outside the UNCLOS system. To date, such challenges are speculative; however, the 
variety of potential challengers and forums should lay bare the notion that the only 
thing corporations have to fear is fear itself.193
Corporate reluctance to proceed on the seafloor may also arise from the perception 
that a more immediate non-legal risk looms larger. The most threatening prospect 
for prospective seafloor operators today—other than a foreign navy or coast guard 
vessel arriving to forcibly eject them from an offshore site—may be the potential 
loss of reputation that would result from undertaking a “rogue” operation outside the 
UNCLOS regime.194 Companies with global operations and markets rely on political 
support from foreign governments, financial support from foreign investors, and 
market support from foreign consumers. Companies may be loath to jeopardize 
success abroad by taking action that might antagonize these pillars of a favorable 
business climate.195
The Case for Political Stability
As this paper has attempted to demonstrate, UNCLOS supports a variety of 
important U.S. interests in the Arctic. The U.S. decision to support UNCLOS as 
the Arctic’s governing legal framework was, and remains, sound policy.
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To be sure, the UNCLOS framework is not a panacea. Arctic Council members do not 
always share the same interpretations of specific convention provisions. While this 
introduces complexity, it should not overshadow the fact that agreement on a common 
legal framework reduces a significant potential barrier to progress. Moreover, lest 
anyone be overly focused on UNCLOS’ gaps or ambiguities, UNCLOS skeptics would 
do well to realize the United States could do much worse.
The Arctic Council’s May 2013 decision to grant observer status to China, India, South 
Korea, Singapore, and Italy underscores the obvious: important international actors 
outside the Arctic are intensely concerned with the region’s future.196 Currently, the 
new Arctic Council observer states have no votes and their formal participation in 
Arctic governance is limited to non-voting roles in working groups.197 Going forward, 
however, it seems reasonable to ask whether China will be content to continue with a 
tangential role in Arctic decision-making. As one observer has noted:
The mantra that the Arctic and its natural resource wealth belong to no one 
country or group of countries but constitute the common heritage of all 
humankind is virtually de rigueur in recent Chinese public commentary on 
Arctic affairs. There are also indications that China sees itself at the vanguard 
of the rest of humanity and the international community in this regard.198
Although it is clear that the vast Arctic resources are attractive to China,199 
predictions about China’s political intentions in the Arctic should be made cautiously. 
Official government statements have been limited and writing originating from 
the Chinese academic community is not always a reliable indicator of future state 
behavior. With this caveat in mind, however, there is evidence that at least some 
Chinese may be disenchanted with China’s near-term access to Arctic resources. 
In 2010, a Chinese admiral claimed that since China has 20 percent of the world’s 
population, it should have 20 percent of the Arctic’s resources.200 While this may not 
reflect official Chinese policy, it may reflect a sense of moral entitlement to Arctic sea 
routes and resources.201 As one Chinese scholar sees it:
Arctic littoral states . . . all want to dip their cups into the rich stew of oil and 
natural gas in the Arctic Ocean. [China should play a role] in the formulation 
of international law . . . and jurisdiction over resources and sea routes and do 
its utmost in the Arctic to make its own voice heard and strengthen its right to 
speak up. Only those who become owners of resources will be able to obtain 
their rightful value.202
Other Chinese scholars have suggested that UNCLOS does not entirely safeguard 
China’s perceived Arctic interests, noting correctly that if Arctic states exercise their 
extended continental shelf rights under UNCLOS, China’s opportunity to partake of 
the “common heritage” in the Arctic will be greatly diminished.203
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To be fair, it would be a mistake to ignore evidence that China currently seems to 
support UNCLOS as the governing legal regime for the Arctic.204 This is logical, 
given UNCLOS’ protection of navigational freedoms and China’s interest in the 
potential for shorter sea routes through the Northern Sea Route and Northwest 
Passage. Support for UNCLOS’ free navigation provisions, however, does not require 
support for UNCLOS’ seafloor provisions. In fact, one can easily conceive China 
bringing its influence to bear in support of an Arctic treaty and accompanying legal 
regime “uniquely tailored” for the “special needs of the Arctic and the international 
community.”
China, the European Union, or other member states could also attempt to amend 
UNCLOS in ways that could change the favorable extended continental shelf 
and deep seabed mining regimes, or give coastal states more control beyond 
their territorial seas and potentially obstruct the freedoms to navigate and to 
lay and maintain international cables. Without access to UNCLOS procedures, 
the United States loses the force of its objections and risks being a bystander as 
Member States effectively amend customary international law through UNCLOS 
amendments.205
In the years to come, will China continue to support a legal regime in the Arctic 
that excludes China from the vast majority of the Arctic’s seafloor resources? And if 
China finds the UNCLOS seafloor regime constricting and employs its considerable 
influence and financial strength to lobby for offshore investment or for a new 
approach, will other states without Arctic coastlines follow suit? Calls for an Arctic 
treaty are not new,206 and given China’s interests, such an effort would hardly be 
surprising.207 If such a movement were to arise, it is difficult to argue that the United 
States would be in a stronger position to resist change as an uncommitted outsider 
rather than a full-fledged member state.
Summary
This paper has examined the question of whether the United States’ failure to 
join UNCLOS helps or hurts U.S. interests in the Arctic. After reviewing the range of 
U.S. interests and UNCLOS application thereto, as well as the objections of UNCLOS 
opponents, there is little reason to conclude that joining UNCLOS could hurt U.S. 
interests. Indeed, in many ways, UNCLOS accession would benefit the United States. 
Going forward, the precise extent to which accession would help U.S. objectives 
will depend in large measure on the importance policymakers attach to resources 
on and below the seafloor more than 200 miles from Alaska’s coast. If the United 
States wishes to maintain maximum flexibility to develop its potential resources in 
this domain, the U.S. should accede to UNCLOS at the soonest earliest opportunity. 
Failure to do so increases the likelihood that the “package deal” so favorable to U.S. 
interests will not endure to the detriment of U.S. interests.
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Representatives of major U.S. corporations with potential interests on the 
seafloor have rightly expressed concern about making necessary investments and 
proceeding with seafloor projects as long as the United States remains outside 
UNCLOS. As long as the United States remains outside UNCLOS, any U.S.-licensed 
activity on the U.S. extended continental shelf will be legally suspect and vulnerable 
to challenge. Given these risks, as well as concerns about international reputation, 
important U.S. industries will likely remain unwilling to proceed. In the meantime, 
UNCLOS member states continue to queue up to perfect their own outer limits of 
the extended continental shelf before the CLCS. If the United States were to accede 
to the convention today and submit a proposal to the CLCS tomorrow, the CLCS will 
not likely consider the petition until at least 2030. This time frame will continue to 
expand until the United States joins the queue, which it cannot do from outside the 
convention.
The forfeiture of UNCLOS benefits, on the seafloor or elsewhere, is particularly 
troubling given that the benefits are available at minimal cost. As discussed within, 
opposition arguments suggesting otherwise suffer from important legal defects as 
well as flawed policy assumptions. Given that many of these arguments have played 
a prominent role in the current UNCLOS stalemate, Arctic policymakers must 
consider whether there may be new, more effective ways to persuade undecided 
senators to confront the specifics of opposition arguments.
Arctic policymakers must also overcome the inertia arising from the fact that 
near-term prospects for industry action on the Arctic extended continental shelf 
and beyond seem remote. Potential Arctic benefits, no matter how lucrative, 
provide little political incentive for immediate action. Incentive is further reduced 
by the ease with which the United States has been able to enjoy many UNCLOS 
benefits without joining the convention. While this has contributed to a more 
stable maritime legal regime conducive to U.S. global interests, it has also led 
UNCLOS opponents to claim successfully—albeit unwisely, and, in some instances 
incorrectly—that the United States can continue to exploit all UNCLOS benefits 
without paying the minimal costs of UNCLOS membership. Application of this 
fallacy to the Arctic could be costly.
The United States should join UNCLOS to fully preserve U.S. Arctic interests. 
Although some of the convention’s most important advantages in the Arctic may 
not be immediately available, UNCLOS would allow the United States to preserve 
maximum flexibility today for developing offshore energy resources tomorrow. In 
addition, accession would reinforce a legal regime favorable to other important 
U.S. Arctic interests as well, and deter prospects for the UNCLOS to collapse or be 
revised to the detriment of U.S. interests.
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